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 Joint cognition refers to the mental systems that support group performance when 
carrying out a shared, or jointly owned task. We focused here on understanding the social 
configurations that underpin key phenomena in joint cognition; in particular, whether 
individual cognition in task-sharing environments is mostly shaped by social factors or not. 
To this end, we investigated, first and mainly, whether human presence is necessary for the 
creation of joint performance; second and separately, whether prior experience of task 
sharing has an adaptive influence on subsequent individual choices; and third and 
additionally, whether individual differences in a social trait mediate joint performance. We 
describe an experiment in which participants combined with another human or a computer 
as they attempted to generate a paired sequence that was as random as possible. First, we 
found little difference in joint performance with regard to whether a human or a computer 
was the co-participant, except for immediate repetitive response. Second, we found 
evidence for choice adaptation, but only under the lower time pressure. Third, we replicated 
previous research in which no systematic link was established between social desirability 
and joint performance. We conclude that joint cognition phenomena may be rooted 






































































 Allport, Styles, and Hsieh (1994) noted that a standard, almost monolithic, 
approach to the study of cognitive phenomena at the time was to require individuals to 
carry out a single task, repeatedly, for a long period of time. This was designed to facilitate 
the accumulation of a large and stable pattern of data that could both address the mechanics 
of cognition and constrain theoretical models of performance. Allport et al. (1994) pointed 
out the severe limitation – even artificiality – of this paradigmatic approach, since 
real-world behavior does not involve such singular, repetitive activity. Nor is it the case that 
changes in cognitive processes, when they happen, result from an external signal. As a 
solution, Allport et al. advocated (using a paradigm championed also by Rogers & Monsell, 
1995 and reviving work pioneered by Jersild, 1927) the analysis of task-switching, 
requiring at least two sets of stimulus-response mappings to be ready for deployment, being 
juggled so that one might be implemented at any time. Task switching has turned out to be a 
highly complex, but also immensely rich approach to the study of executive control (e.g., 
Kiesel et al., 2010). Yet there is an alternative solution to the methodological straight-jacket 
characterized by Allport et al. (1994) – which has received much less analysis. Alongside 
task-switching, one might consider task-sharing as a complementary approach to the 
repetition of a single task completed by a single person. That is, rather than deploying two 
tasks to be completed by a single person, one can envisage one task completed by more 




































































objective. (i.e., instead of a mapping of 1 individual : several task sets, one has a mapping 
of 1 task set : several individuals). An overarching question then becomes; how do different 
individuals contribute to task performance? That is, how does task-sharing shape individual 
cognition? 
 A related field is that of joint action (see Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006), 
which focuses on how individuals coordinate their actions – that is motoric behaviors. Joint 
action research is an important and vibrant contemporary field (Vesper et al., 2017). 
However, often in joint action, each performer has a different role, which at some level 
interacts with their partner’s role. To provide a real-world example, team sport players may 
have a common objective but take different responsibilities and coordinate them in order to 
achieve the common purpose. 
 More relevantly, recent research has begun to address how executive functions 
operate in social settings, through analysis of a joint task-switching paradigm (e.g., 
Dudarev & Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 2016; Wenke et al., 2011; Yamaguchi, Wall, & 
Hommel, 2017a, 2017b;). Dudarev and Hassin (2016) as well as Liefooghe (2016) 
demonstrate switch costs occur even when one participant shifts to and from the irrelevant 
task assigned to the other participant. According to the authors, this is taken to suggest that 
people not only represent the task sets of others but also track the task processes in their 
minds. Consequently it is argued that executive functions are used in participant / task 




































































with participant switching. In order to overcome this, Yamaguchi et al. (2017b) asked two 
participants to engage in the same two tasks and estimated task switch costs both when the 
participants switched from one trial to the next and when one participant repeated 
consecutive trials by implementing a within-participants design. The authors described 
evidence for task switch costs only when the same participant repeated trials but not when 
participants switched. This provides strong evidence against the claim that people represent 
task sets of relevant others even if they do not need to coordinate those tasks in joint task 
settings (e.g., Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). Yamaguchi et al. (2017a) also reported 
that task switch costs are present even when participants switched in a goal-sharing 
condition where two co-participants acknowledged that they were sharing the effects / 
results of their actions. Such a finding confirms the importance of shared task goal in joint 
task settings. Whilst this recent research on joint task switching offers a valuable insight 
with respect to social engagement of executive functions, in these joint task-switching 
studies each participant is not asked to optimize group performance by intentionally and 
adaptively integrating their choices with those from someone else to form a group, or 
emergent product. To draw again on the analogy of a team sport, joint task switching does 
not require any reaction to what other team members do. 
 In contrast, Towse, Towse, Saito, Maehara, and Miyake (2016) explored the 
sharing of a cognitive task among multiple people, each contributor playing an equal and 




































































combined random number sequence, a known executive function paradigm (see Cooper, 
2016; Towse, 1998). Random sequence production can be completed individually, but the 
task structure makes it highly amenable to being shared by a dyad, especially when 
compared with group activities like idea generation (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). Towse et al. 
found strong evidence for a phenomenon of “response contagion”. That is, when participant 
“A” produced a particular response choice, participant “B” in following on with the next 
choice would be likely to produce an associated value. The combined sequence contained 
more occurrences of neighboring values (e.g., 1 followed by 2, 8 followed by 7) than 
sequences produced by the dyad members tested alone at the same overall pace. Since pairs 
alternated responses, this shows the extent to which each person incorporated or 
represented their partner’s response. Their partner’s response set up even stronger prepotent 
continuation choices than their own immediately preceding response did. In addition, the 
combined sequence also contained few immediate response repetitions, which is the case 
also for individually produced sequences. That is, almost invariably participants do not 
repeat their own response choices in random sequences (see Towse, 1998; Towse & Neil, 
1998) and when operating as a dyad, individuals strongly avoided repeating what their 
partner said too. 
 In studying how cognition is shaped by a collaborative environment, Towse et al. 
(2016) also explored whether the pattern of performance was dependent on their being an 




































































with an Experimenter to produce combined sequences. The participant was fully aware that 
they were turn-taking with the Experimenter. It was also visibly apparent that the 
Experimenter choices came from reading a list of responses on paper. Therefore, the 
Experimenter was clearly not being influenced by the participant. Nonetheless, participants 
made sequence choices in this semi-interactional configuration that closely aligned those of 
the fully-interactional configuration of Experiment 1. 
 Among several questions not fully addressed by Towse et al. (2016), a key issue is 
the extent to which human agency within the dyad is paramount. Therefore, our first 
objective for the present study is to determine if a human partner is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the creation of an interactional context that leads to response 
contagion aforementioned. Participants were co-present with another person – albeit known 
as an Experimenter and visibly reading from a typed sheet in Experiment 2 of Towse et al. 
(2016). Perhaps the human presence over-rode any top-down situational knowledge and 
effectively created an interactional environment for the participant. We suggest this is a 
contemporary issue for joint action research also (Dolk et al., 2014a), where the notion of 
co-representation of stimulus-response mappings has been analyzed by deploying partners 
hidden behind a screen (Obhi & Hall, 2011), humanoid robots (Stenzel et al., 2012) or with 
a Japanese waving cat (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2014b). We address this issue by 
asking participants to generate combined random number sequences with in one condition a 




































































human, purportedly interactional partner). We aim to establish the extent to which human 
interaction is required for collaborative effects. Notably, we implement a within-participant 
design to expose participants to both interactional configurations, and facilitate their 
comparison.  
 Relating to the first objective, we predicted that in the present study, using the 
same paradigm as Towse et al. (2016), joint sequences – specifically with respect to 
stereotyped choice pairs – would be less random when the partner is another human than 
when a non-human computer. In other words, the sequence quality in joint performance 
would be impaired compared with baseline and individual performance when the partner is 
a human than when a computer. We predicted that features of joint performances including 
response contagion observed in Towse et al. (2016) were amplified by human presence. 
Since we are not aware of any data or theory directly examining agency effects in joint 
random generation, here we reason by analogy to joint action research. Many studies have 
investigated agency effects with joint Simon paradigms and indicated that intentionality and 
perceived interpersonal similarity attributed to others (e.g., Stenzel et al., 2012; Müller et al., 
2011) elicit a joint Simon effect, in the form of slower reaction times on incompatible 
stimulus-response trials than compatible stimulus-response trials. This allows us to infer 
that in a joint Simon task, interacting with another human that is believed an intentional 
agent imposes larger executive functions demands than when interacting with a computer 




































































random generation settings, paired performance with another human partner will be less 
random than with a non-human computer. This in turn would support a more social view of 
joint cognition whereby human presence as a partner automatically recruits executive 
functions (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016).  
 A second objective focuses on specifying the nature of response adaptation and 
learning that potentially results from experience in joint performance. The second objective 
examines longer-term impacts of task-sharing on individual cognition between 
experimental conditions, while the first objective for partner’s agency effect examines 
on-going impacts of task-sharing on individual cognition within one experimental condition. 
More specifically, we investigated whether choice adaptation is observed in joint cognition. 
Choice adaptation refers here to the uninstructed change in choice decisions, in other words 
self-directed learning from one’s recent experience. Evidence for choice adaptation would 
be important for computational accounts of random generation task performance – by 
indicating the plasticity in response selection - and likewise for accounts of executive 
function performance constraints (the role of more direct or explicit instruction in random 
choices is interesting but is separate – see Brugger (1997) for an early review, and 
Neuringer (1986) for an exemplar dataset). Choice adaptation is theoretically important for 
understanding random generation behavior, because it demonstrates that random generation 
is sufficiently malleable that response decisions are not only affected by participant’s 




































































as the immediately preceding choices that is functionally transient on the other hand. It 
would suggest that in addition, we should recognize short to medium term experiences 
during the experiment.  
Choice adaptation is also important theoretically for understanding joint cognition, 
because it provides an additional empirical phenomenon of the sensitivity to the choices a 
partner makes. To our knowledge, however, choice adaptation has received relatively little 
attention in the literature on random generation this far. We suggest this is because 
experimental contexts have not been designed to pick up on medium term changes in 
choice behavior. When a random sequence is collaboratively generated by two genuine 
participants, of course one has very limited control over each contributor’s choices, and 
thus the opportunity for systematically studying choice adaptation is limited. And we know 
from studies that individuals are at least partially predictable (i.e., not random) when 
producing sequences – so in the dyad, each likely experiences similar biases from another 
as they exhibit themselves. 
 Towse et al. (2016) discussed some highly tentative evidence for choice adaptation. 
As already noted, responses are rarely repeated in human sequences. However, in 
Experiment 2, participants experienced the Experimenter repeating their choices, because 
the Experimenter used a quasi-random sequence that was truly independent of the 
participant. Participants who gave individual sequences after the paired sequences – and 




































































participants who gave individual sequences first, and so had yet to experience the dyadic 
environment. Yet this order effect, whilst moderate in size (η2 =.107) was not statistically 
reliable. Therefore, in the current study we can investigate the possibility of choice 
adaptation more systematically in the confederate condition, since certain digram 
permutations can be expected to occur and participants thus encounter such possibilities, 
apparently when they are working within a collaborative setting. We ask whether 
participants can use this experience to modify their selections when they perform 
individually. Considering statistical non-significance of a task order effect in Towse et al. 
(2016), we suspect that choice adaptation is in any case a subtle effect. It might be 
necessary to inspect whether choice adaptation occurs more closely – for each response 
pace. Because slower response pace generally admits of more deliberate adaptation of 
responses in random generation by individual (Baddeley, 1966; Jahanshahi, Dirnberger, 
Fuller, & Frith, 2000; Towse, 1998), participants in a slow pace task might be likely to 
apply repetitive responses learned in dyadic environments to their own responses. 
 A third objective for the present study focused on individual differences. Towse et 
al. (2016) also collected ancillary data from participants in the form of a Social Desirability 
Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), in order to investigate whether conjoint 
performance in general, and social interactional alignment in particular, varied as an 
individual-difference trait, and then did not find any reliable correlations. Towse et al. 




































































performance and self-reported social desirability only for American and British participants 
(Experiment 1) but not for Japanese participants (Experiment 3). Japanese generally put 
greater importance on group harmony, group goals, and working in groups compared to 
Americans, although Japanese are not more collectivistic than Americans as a whole 
(Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Is there a possibility that individual difference 
in social desirability mediates conjoint performances among Japanese, who putatively think 
much of group performance? The current study recruited Japanese participants. Given the 
orientation towards human agency in the current study, we administered the social 
desirability measure as a potentially relevant individual difference construct. We addressed 
whether there is evidence for a pattern of individual differences on the quality of random 
generation that links to personality traits.  
 In summary, through experimental investigation concentrating on three objectives, 
we aimed at better understanding how task-sharing shapes individual cognition as well as 
extending the research of Towse et al. (2016); primarily, we wish to make clear whether 
individual cognition in task-sharing environments is affected mostly by social factors or not. 
The first and foremost objective is to examine the contribution of social interaction and 
human agency in joint cognition; specifically, to investigate whether characteristics of joint 
performance in a random generation paradigm would be ascribed to acting with a human 
partner (i.e., considerable difference in performances between with a human partner and 




































































partner (i.e., little difference in performances between with a human partner and with a 
computer partner). The second objective is to address the notion of choice adaptation in 
performance; specifically, to investigate whether experience of immediate repetitions that 
the partner produced in joint environments would bring about an increase in self repetition 
for the subsequent individual environments or not. The third objective is to investigate 
whether joint performance with a human partner would vary as individual difference in 
social desirability or not. For simplicity and comparability with motivating work, 




 Sample size was estimated on the basis on Towse et al. (2016), in which 40, 32, 
and 34 participants took part in Experiments 1 - 3, respectively. Therefore, we decided to 
recruit 40 participants in this experiment, taking a few data exclusions into consideration. 
Forty students from Kyoto University took part in this experiment (mean age = 21.0 years; 
27 females and 13 males) and received ¥500 worth of book coupon. Before participation, 
all participants provided a written consent form, which stated their right to withdraw the 
experiment whenever they would like for any reason. 
 There was no local ethics committee or formal ethical approval process instituted 




































































Declaration of Helsinki and the Ethical Principles of the Japanese Psychological 
Association (JPA) and the American Psychological Association (APA). Additionally, the 
experimental protocol closely followed those described in Towse et al. (2016) with respect 
to ethical issues, and Experiments 1 and 2 of the previous study had been approved by two 
institutional ethics committees. 
Procedure 
 All participants initially completed the Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960), which is a popular instrument consisting of 33 yes-no question items to 
measure whether individuals attempt to behave according to desirable social norms in 
various daily situations. We evaluated whether individual orientation towards social 
alignment would be linked to joint cognition performance with a human partner. 
Afterwards, they produced four random number generation sequences. Following 
Towse et al. (2016), two individual sequences were generated at a slow (individual slow 
condition – one response every 3 seconds) or fast pace (individual fast condition – one 
response every 1.5 seconds). A third sequence was generated jointly with another 
“participant” who was actually a confederate (joint-confederate condition), and the fourth 
sequence comprised joint production with a computer (joint-computer condition). In the 
two joint production conditions, combined response rate was the same as the individual-fast 
condition and thus, because of alternation, individual’s response rate was the same as for 




































































counterbalanced within the block. The order of tasks (blocked individual, joint-confederate, 
joint-computer) was counterbalanced.  
 In all conditions, following Towse et al. (2016), participants were asked to produce 
as random a sequence as possible using numbers between 1 and 10. Participants were 
encouraged to imagine repeatedly rolling a 10-sided dice and reporting the numbers that the 
dice displayed (the use of dice imagery is common in random generation instructions). 
Participants were instructed to select the 10 alternatives equally often and avoid fixed 
sequence patterns. An auditory tone (a beep signal) emitted by the computer set a regular 
interval during which participants should verbally announce a number. The importance of 
maintaining response pace was emphasized. All of the participants’ number choices were 
written down on data sheets by an Experimenter. 
 In both individual conditions, participants performed the tasks alone and generated 
100 number responses between 1 and 10 in as random an order as possible.  
 In the joint-confederate condition, each participant received explanations about the 
task prior to the entry of another participant, actually a confederate, into the room. 
Participants were instructed to generate a sequence by giving a number alternately with 
their partner and to make the combined sequence as random as possible. Participants were 
also told that they must not speak to their partner so as to minimize bias caused by 
individual impressions and that their partner was also instructed in the same way by another 




































































interaction; actually, all participants nodded but did not exchange a single word to the 
confederate. Participants sat down across a desk from their partner and took it in turns again 
to generate a number between 1 and 10 to accompany a beep tone every 1.5 seconds. A 
monitor was set up to be over the left shoulder of the participant and another monitor over 
the right shoulder of the confederate (see Fig. 1a). Each person could see the monitor 
behind their partner but not the monitor behind them. For each participant response, an 
asterisk was presented on the monitor behind the partner synchronously with a beep tone 
and then participants verbally produced a number on these signals. For each response turn 
of the confederate, a number was presented on the monitor behind the participant with a 
beep tone and the confederate simply read it aloud. Participants ought to perceive the 
partner watching the monitor as natural, because they would expect in their partner’s turn 
an asterisk cue to be shown on their monitor, as was the case for them. The confederate 
number sequence was pre-prepared and constant for all dyads (generated using the 
RANDBETWEEN function of Microsoft Excel 2007). After a practice event in which 
participants and the confederate together contributed 20 numbers (10 numbers each 
alternately), participants tackled the main task in which they made a combined sequence 
consisted of 200 numbers (100 numbers each alternately). 
 In the joint-computer condition, participants were instructed to generate a sequence 
by giving a number alternately with a PC and make the combined sequence as random as 




































































in turns to generate a number between 1 and 10, synchronously with a beep tone, the 
participant generating a response every 3 seconds to accompany what the computer 
produced. For each response turn of the participant, an asterisk appeared on the monitor 
with a beep tone and then participants produced a number on this signal. For each computer 
turn, the computer produced a number using as female voice accompanying a beep tone; at 
that time, there was no image presented on the monitor. Although participants were told 
that the computer randomly selected a number every time, the computer reproduced the 
same pre-prepared sequence deployed in the joint-confederate condition. Therefore, the 
same pre-prepared sequence was used for all participants both in the joint confederate and 
joint computer task. After a practice trial in which participants and the PC made a 
combined sequence consisted of 20 numbers (10 numbers each alternately), participants 
tackled the main trial in which they made a combined sequence consisted of 200 numbers 
(100 numbers each alternately). 
 After completing all four random number generation sequences, participants were 
asked whether they had been aware that the partner just read out a number that was 
displayed on the monitor behind them. Two participants (one female and one male) 
mentioned some suspicion that this was the case. Their data were therefore excluded from 
analysis, yielding 38 participants in the full dataset. Finally, participants were debriefed. 
Measures 




































































executive functioning profile of those who produce such responses. Whilst many 
randomness indices can be calculated, they can be categorized into a few clusters that 
reflect different types of executive functioning (Miyake et al., 2000; Towse & Neil, 1998). 
Following Towse et al. (2016), we implement an analysis using four performance 
indices―Digram Use, Adjacency, Immediate Repetition, Redundancy―that are 
representative of each type of executive functioning, and available through RGCalc (Towse 
& Neil, 1998, which documents full computational descriptions). 
 Digram Use (or RNG; Evans, 1978) is a measure of stereotyped sequencing, which 
identifies repeated occurrences of two-item permutations among all responses. Digram Use 
values increases as paired combinations are preferentially emitted, which means a higher 
value indicates less randomness. Adjacency represents the frequency of two neighboring 
numbers such as 2, 3 and 8, 7. Adjacency score increases as such combinations appear, 
which means the higher value indicates the less randomness. Digram Use and Adjacency 
are argued to be potentially sensitive to different types of prepotent response inhibition: the 
former reflects inhibition of individual, more idiosyncratic combinations while the latter 
reflects inhibition of conventional responses for all individuals. Immediate Repetition 
represents the frequency of the same numbers selected twice in succession such as 5, 5. 
When participants perform random generation without specific restriction, Immediate 
Repetition scores are invariably much lower than they ought to be in an ideal random 




































































consecutive responses in a truly random sequence). Redundancy expresses the evenness of 
the response frequency distribution. While the above three indices certainly reflect prompt 
responses to the preceding choice, Redundancy reflects maintenance and monitoring of a 
relatively long-term sequence of choices. Redundancy score increases as specific 
alternatives are generated more often than others, which means the higher values indicates 
the less evenness.  
 
Results 
 We specify all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). The raw data from this study can be accessed 
from the following URL: http://XXX [URL blinded for review]. For transparency, the raw 
data also identifies and includes the two participants noted above who showed some 
suspicion of the confederate’s status (i.e., full sample size N = 40). The raw data comprise 
the random sequences from each participant. 
Influence of a human partner in joint random generation 
 The first objective of this experiment is to examine social influences of a human 
partner on executive functioning in a joint task. Accordingly, we directly compare 
performance in the joint-confederate and joint-computer conditions. However, we also 
follow the analytic approach from Towse et al. (2016) whereby true pair sequences (from 




































































sequences were obtained for each participant by artificially merging the individual slow 
sequence and the pre-prepared confederate / computer sequence. These composite 
productions form a baseline condition insofar as they represent joint choices from two truly 
independent sources. That is, they included the same pre-prepared sequence as for the joint 
tasks, but participant choices produced individually. 
 The left side of Table 1 summarizes means and standard deviations of randomness 
indices derived from RGCalc using all 200 responses in joint sequences. However, joint 
sequences include the pre-prepared response set of confederate / computer, so that indices 
calculated from all responses might be biased by these non-participant items. Therefore, in 
order to estimate participants’ performance in a more impartial way, we also calculated 
each index on the basis solely of participants’ responses. To calculate Digram Use, 
Adjacency, and Immediate Repetition based on participants’ decisions, we used only 
response pairs each of which consists of a response of participant following a pre-prepared 
response of confederate / computer, so as to identify specifically the extent to which 
participants gave a stereotypical response, a numerical neighbors, and the identical number 
to their partner’s response, respectively. That is, given a joint sequence CPCPCPCP..., 
where C is a pre-prepared response of confederate / computer and P is a genuine participant 
response, we calculated these three indices from only CP bigrams and not PC bigrams. 
With regard to Redundancy, we used only the responses of participants by excluding the 




































































sequence CPCPCPCP..., we calculated this new Redundancy index from a sequence 
including only P (i.e., PPPPPP...). The right side of Table 1 summarizes means and 
standard deviations of randomness indices calculated from only participants’ responses in 
joint sequences. For distinction, labels “- All” and “- Only” were attached to joint 
randomness indices calculated from all 200 responses and only participants’ responses, 
respectively. 
 A series of one-way within-participants ANOVAs (confederate vs. computer vs. 
composite) was then performed for each performance index as dependent variable, and 
omnibus effects were established in each case.  
 Digram Use - All scores differed across conditions, F (2, 74) = 5.01, p = .009, η2 
= .119; composite sequences were significantly more random (exhibiting lower scores) than 
both the joint-confederate [t (37) = 2.52, p = .016, η2 = .144] and the joint-computer 
condition [t (37) = 3.30, p = .002, η2 = .230], while the latter two conditions did not differ 
significantly [t (37) = 0.49, p = .631, η2 = .006]. We then analyzed Digram Use - Only 
scores and found almost identical pattern of results to the above, F (2, 74) = 16.69, p < .001, 
η2 = .311; the composite sequences were significantly more random (exhibiting lower 
scores) than both the joint-confederate [t (37) = 4.09, p < .001, η2 = .314] and 
joint-computer sequence [t (37) = 5.29, p < .001, η2 = .436], while the latter two conditions 
did not reach significance [t (37) = 1.70, p = .097, η2 = .073]. 




































































η2 = .080; joint-confederate sequences were significantly more random (exhibiting lower 
scores) than joint-computer sequences [t (37) = 2.91, p = .006, η2 = .185] but 
joint-confederate and joint-computer sequences were not significantly different from the 
composite sequences [t (37) = 0.36, p = .718, η2 = .004 and t (37) = 1.68, p = .102, η2 
= .073]. We then analyzed Adjacency - Only scores and did not find a significant difference 
across conditions, F (2, 74) = 0.34, p = .717, η2 = .009. Thus, the Adjacency advantage of 
the joint-confederate condition over the joint-computer condition among all responses was 
not uniquely observed in participants’ decisions. 
 Immediate Repetition - All scores also differed across conditions, F (2, 74) = 44.19, 
p < .001, η2 = .544; the frequency of immediate repetition in the composite sequences was 
significantly and substantially greater than both in the joint-confederate and joint-computer 
sequences [t (37) = 7.29, p < .001, η2 = .593 and t (37) = 8.27, p < .001, η2 = .656]. Also, 
the joint-confederate sequences had significantly more repetitions than the joint-computer 
sequences [t (37) = 2.35, p = .024, η2 = .130]. To examine this further, we then analyzed 
Immediate Repetition - Only scores. Participant’s repetitions in joint task settings are so 
rare that the data distribution is highly skewed and thus we employed parametric and 
non-parametric tests. A one-way within-participants ANOVA showed a significant 
difference across conditions, F (2, 74) = 168.68, p < .001, η2 = .818. The frequency in the 
composite sequence was significantly greater than both in the joint-confederate and 




































































η2 = .832]; furthermore, the frequency of immediate repetition in the confederate condition 
was marginally significant than in the computer condition [t (37) = 1.96, p = .058, η2 
= .096]. A non-parametric Friedman test for the same dataset also showed a significant 
difference across conditions, χ2 (2) = 58.53, p < .001. Wilcoxon’s signed rank tests showed 
much more repetitions in the composite sequence than both in the joint-confederate and 
joint-computer conditions [T = 0.0, z = -5.23, p < .001 and T = 2.0, z = -5.34, p < .001] and 
also a significant increase in the frequency of immediate repetition in the joint-confederate 
condition compared to in the joint-computer condition [T = 90.0, z = -1.98, p = .047]. Thus, 
the Immediate Repetition advantage of the joint-confederate condition over the 
joint-computer condition among all responses remained in participants’ decisions. 
 Redundancy - All scores also differed across conditions, F (2, 74) = 5.60, p = .005, 
η2 = .131; composite sequences were significantly and substantially more random 
(exhibiting lower scores) than both joint-confederate and joint-computer sequences [t (37) 
= 3.29, p = .002, η2 = .230 and t (37) = 2.81, p = .008, η2 = .176] but joint sequences were 
not significantly different from each other [t (37) = 0.05, p = .958, η2 < .001]. Further, we 
conducted analyses on Redundancy - Only scores and found the same pattern as the above, 
F (2, 74) = 12.21, p < .001, η2 = .248; composite sequences were significantly and 
substantially more random (exhibiting lower scores) than both joint-confederate and 
joint-computer sequences [t (37) = 4.11, p < .001, η2 = .314 and t (37) = 4.47, p < .001, η2 




































































= .700, η2 = .004]. 
 In summary, (1) joint sequences were generally less random than the composite 
baseline irrespective of the partner’s agency, (2) joint performance with respect to prepotent 
response inhibition (i.e., Digram Use and Adjacency) and sequence monitoring (i.e., 
Redundancy) did not differ as a function of whether the partner was a human or a computer, 
and (3) the only difference in performance between a human partner and a computer partner 
appeared in Immediate Repetition. 
Comparisons between individual and joint sequences 
 Next, this section focuses the characteristics of joint performance in comparison 
with individual performance, in contrast with the preceding section focusing on comparison 
with ideal baseline performance (i.e., composite sequences). To do so, we compared 
performance in the joint and individual sequences. This also established whether the current 
results are different or not from Experiment 1 of Towse et al. (2016), in which participants 
in a dyad were both naive and interacting cooperatively. We use as a randomness measure 
in the joint condition the mean of the two randomness scores calculated from the first 100 
and second 100 responses in each joint sequence, because it is inappropriate to compare 
directly randomness indices from different response sequence lengths. Table 2 summarizes 
mean randomness scores based on 100 responses of the individual and joint sequences. A 
series of one-way within-participants ANOVAs (individual-slow vs. individual-fast vs. 




































































subsidiary analyses (post-hoc t-tests or Wilcoxon’s signed rank tests) were summerized in 
Appendix Table A1. 
 Digram Use scores differed across conditions, F (3, 111) = 23.49, p < .001, η2 
= .388. Subsidiary analyses revealed no significant differences between joint-confederate 
and joint-sequences and a marginal difference between individual-slow and individual-fast 
sequences; but all the other comparisons were significant. Therefore the order of 
randomness regarding Digram Use is as follows: individual-fast ≤ individual-slow < joint 
conditions. This pattern of results is consistent with Towse et al. (2016). 
 Adjacency scores also differed across conditions, F (3, 111) = 21.98, p < .001, η2 
= .373. Subsidiary analyses revealed that all pairwise comparisons were significant, except 
a marginal difference between the individual-fast and joint-computer conditions. Therefore 
the order of randomness regarding Adjacency is as follows: individual-fast ≤ 
joint-computer < joint-confederate < individual-slow. This pattern of results is also 
consistent with Towse et al. (2016). 
 Immediate Repetition scores also differed across conditions, F (3, 111) = 179.91, p 
< .001, η2 = .829. Subsidiary analyses revealed that all pairwise comparisons were 
significant except individual-slow vs. individual-fast. Therefore the frequency of Immediate 
Repetition is as follows: individual conditions < joint-computer < joint-confederate. This 
pattern of results is not consistent with Towse et al. (2016), who indicated that individual 




































































non-parametric Friedman test for the same dataset confirmed a significant difference across 
conditions, χ2 (3) = 98.21, p < .001. Subsidiary non-parametric comparisons produced an 
identical pattern of significant outcomes to the above parametric comparisons. 
 Redundancy scores also differed across conditions, F (3, 111) = 3.47, p = .019, η2 
= .086. Subsidiary analyses revealed that the numbers generated in the individual-slow 
condition were more evenly distributed than in the other three conditions, which did not 
differ from each other. Therefore, the order of randomness regarding Redundancy is as 
follows: joint conditions = individual-fast < individual-slow. This pattern of results is not 
consistent with Towse et al. (2016), who indicated that the number distribution was more 
even in the joint condition than in the individual conditions. 
 In summary, we replicated two key phenomena regarding individual random 
generation performance: (1) digit sequences generated at fast response pace were generally 
more predictable than those generated at a slow response pace (e.g., Baddeley, 1966), but 
(2) Immediate Repetition was not sensitive to response speed (e.g., Towse, 1998). These 
replications validate the individual tasks in this study. Moreover, we replicated the two 
findings regarding the relationship between the individual and joint performances (Towse 
et al., 2016): (1) Adjacency scores both in joint-confederate and joint-computer sequences 
were worse than those in individual-slow sequences and (2) Adjacency and Digram Use 
scores both in joint-confederate and joint-computer sequences were better than those in 




































































performance involving a human partner in Towse et al. (2016) were replicated with a 
computer partner. However, we also found two different points from previous findings 
regarding the relationship between the individual and joint performances: (1) number 
distributions represented by Redundancy scores were more even in individual sequences 
than in joint sequences and (2) Immediate Repetition in joint sequences was more frequent 
than in individual sequences. 
Participants’ individual contribution to joint random generation 
 We also examine how participants regulate their own responses within joint 
sequences. That is, rather than a focus on the full sequence, here we investigate individuals’ 
contribution to a joint production environment. To do so, we showed “repetition lag,” 
which is the response distance between each alternative and its subsequent reappearance. In 
an example sequence: 7, 10, 4, 2, 2, 5, 7, the repetition lag of 7 is 6 and the repetition lag of 
2 is 1 (= Immediate Repetition). By giving a graphic representation of repetition lags, the 
pattern of sequence history and turn-taking configuration are visually clarified. 
 Fig. 2a shows the lags between repetitions of response alternatives in joint 
sequences. The zig-zag patterns are clear for short lags in all sequences, where the low 
frequency of even repetition lag indicate that participants remembered they had said 
themselves and avoided saying that number soon. However, the zig-zag waves of 
confederate and computer sequences are generally smaller and disappear at earlier lag 




































































within-participants ANOVAs for the frequency of repetition lag at each point of repetition 
lag 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in order to examine whether amplitudes of the zig-zag waves are 
statistically different across conditions. The frequency of repetition lag significantly 
differed across conditions at lag three, F (2, 74) = 12.03, p < .001, η2 = .245, four, F (2, 74) 
= 11.57, p < .001, η2 = .238, five, F (2, 74) = 3.89, p = .025, η2 = .095, and six, F (2, 74) = 
49.57, p < .001, η2 = .573, but not at lag seven, F (2, 74) = 1.59, p = .211, η2 = .041. At all 
data points of lag from 3 through 6, subsidiary analyses (post-hoc t-tests; see Appendix 
Table A2 for detailed statistics) showed that there was no significant difference between the 
confederate and computer conditions, but the composite condition significantly (or 
marginally) from both the confederate and computer conditions. These results indicate that 
peaks and troughs in the zig-zag pattern within confederate and computer sequences are 
reliably smaller than those of composite sequences. Further, in order to examine whether 
the zig-zag waves converge sooner for confederate and computer sequences than for 
composite sequences, we conducted a two-way within-participants ANOVA for the 
frequency of repetition lag with sequence conditions (confederate vs. computer vs. 
composite) and repetition lags (7 vs. 8 vs. 9) as factors. There was a significant interaction 
between the two factors, F (4, 148) = 13.88, p < .001, η2 = .273. For the confederate 
condition, the repetition frequency differed across lags, F (2, 74) = 3.52, p = .035, η2 
= .087; however, the lag 7 and 8 frequencies did not significantly differ from each other [t 




































































not differ across lags, F (2, 74) = 1.07, p = .349, η2 = .028. In summary, the repetition lag 
contours of confederate and computer sequences between lag 7 and 9 do not form a 
v-shaped valley. For the composite condition, on the other hand, the repetition frequency 
differed across lags, F (2, 74) = 47.52, p < .001, η2 = .562; furthermore, the frequencies of 
lag 7, 8, and 9 significantly differed from each other [lag 7 vs. 8, t (37) = 11.02, p < .001, η2 
= .774 ; lag 7 vs. 8, t (37) = 5.00, p < .001, η2 = .410 ; lag 8 vs. 9, t (37) = 4.22, p < .001, η2 
= .325]. In summary, the repetition lag contours of composite sequences between lag 7 and 
9 forms a distinct v-shaped valley. Therefore, the zig-zag waves of confederate and 
computer sequences disappear earlier than that of composite sequences. These different 
patterns in repetition lag indicate that participants regulated or adapted their own responses 
when contributing to a combined sequence. There are usually few short-lag repeats in true 
joint sequences produced by two collaborative participants, while many short-lag repeats 
appear in composite sequences (Towse et al., 2016). In the current experiment, of course, 
confederates and computers produced responses oblivious to the participants’ choice so that 
short-lag repeats increased for the confederate and computer sequences. 
 Fig. 2b shows the lags between repetitions of self responses in joint sequences 
(only even lags in Fig. 2a). The profile of confederate and computer conditions are almost 
identical; in fact, there was no significant difference between confederate and computer 
conditions for all data points from lag 2 through 20 in Fig. 2b, ts (37) < 1.17, ps > .250, η2 




































































their past responses equivalently in the two joint conditions – the presence of human 
agency in the joint settings did not matter here. The confederate and computer graphs in Fig. 
2b are similar to the graphs in Fig. 2c, which illustrate repetition lags of individual tasks. 
All of those graphs show relatively small number of short-lag repeats and a frequency peak 
around eight. This suggests that participants in joint conditions, so as to optimize the net 
performance, attempted to expand interval of repetition in the same way as they did in 
individual conditions. 
 Next, we derived participant-in-pair sequences by extracting only participants’ 
responses from joint sequences. In other words, we removed the confederate and computer 
contributions from the joint sequences. We then calculated the four performance indices 
and the repetition lags already described. All four randomness measures are summarized in 
Table 3. They did not show significant differences between partner type, ts (37) < 1.60, ps 
> .120, η2 < .063 with small to medium effect sizes. The repetition lags were illustrated in 
Fig. 3. The repetition profile for both joint conditions are very similar, in particular for 
short-lag repeats (from 1 through 4); in fact, there was no significant difference between the 
two joint conditions at all data points from lag 1 through 20 in Fig. 3, ts (37) < 1.68, ps 
> .101, η2 < .073 with small to medium effect sizes, excepting for lag 6, t (37) = 1.88, p 
= .068, η2 = .090, and lag 14, t (37) = 2.03, p = .050, η2 = .102. These results suggest that 
participants did not generally change their own response style in joint conditions regardless 




































































Choice adaptation: Influence of task order on Immediate Repetition 
 The second objective of this study was to examine whether participants adapted 
their choice behavior as an experiential consequence of joint task environments. We 
hypothesized that a high incidence of Immediate Repetition in the joint conditions might 
have the effect of increasing Immediate Repetition for subsequent individual productions, 
in particular at a slow response pace, through experiential feedback or choice adaptation. 
Accordingly, we compared Immediate Repetition in the individual conditions as a function 
of whether this occurred before or after engaging in joint conditions1. For slow responses, 
there were significantly more Immediate Repetitions after completing joint conditions (M = 
1.09, SD = 1.72) than before (M = 0.20, SD = 0.54), t (28) = 2.25, p = .032, η2 = .1522. For 
fast responses, the increase in Immediate Repetition after completing joint conditions (M = 
1.17, SD = 2.22) compared to before (M = 0.40, SD = 1.02) was not significant, t (33) = 
1.42, p = .166, η2 = .0583. Both effects were in the same direction, but these data imply 
some degree of strategic application of repetition choices, which was therefore less 
prevalent / systematic in the fast condition under greater time pressure. 
                                                 
1 A two-way mixed ANOVA for individual Immediate Repetition with task order (before 
and after joint conditions; between-participants) and response pace (slow and fast; 
within-participants) as factors indicated that an interaction between the two factors was not 
significant, F (1, 36) = 0.07, p = .787, η2 = .002. We suggest this is because variance of 
Immediate Repetition is commonly too large. However, we suggested the necessity of 
closer inspection of choice adaptation and then set up a specific hypothesis that slow 
response pace, but not fast response pace, in individual task helped participants 
intentionally apply repetitive responses that they had experienced in joint task. Therefore, 
we administered separate analyses for the slow and fast response pace. 
2 Mann-Whitney’s U test: U = 124.0, z = 1.81, p = .070. 




































































 However, such a task-order effect might simply occur as a time effect; that is, 
Immediate Repetition might increase in joint sequences after experiencing individual tasks4. 
We then compared Immediate Repetition - Only scores in the joint conditions as a function 
of whether this occurred before or after engaging in individual conditions. For 
joint-confederate sequences, Immediate Repetition after completing individual conditions 
(M = 2.67, SD = 2.96) was not significantly different from before (M = 1.59, SD = 1.80), t 
(36) = 1.43, p = .161, η2 = .0535. For joint-computer sequences, Immediate Repetition after 
completing individual conditions (M = 1.60, SD = 2.95) was not significantly different from 
before (M = 1.89, SD = 2.65), t (36) = 0.32, p = .754, η2 = .0036. Thus, prior experience of 
individual tasks did not influence repetition choices in subsequent joint tasks. 
 With respect to Immediate Repetition, we examined more generally whether there 
were order effects within the two joint conditions. For the frequency with which 
participants repeated a human partner’s response, there was a non-significant difference 
between those who experienced the joint-computer condition in advance (M = 2.65, SD = 
2.48) and those who did not (M = 1.78, SD = 2.49), t (36) = 1.05, p = .299, η2 = .0297. For 
the frequency with which participants repeated a computer’s response, there is also 
non-significant difference between those who experienced the joint-human condition in 
advance (M = 1.56, SD = 2.95) and those who did not (M = 1.90, SD = 2.53), t (36) = 0.38, 
                                                 
4 We thank a reviewer for identifying this possibility. 
5 Mann-Whitney’s U test: U = 142.5, z = 1.08, p = .280. 
6 Mann-Whitney’s U test: U = 158.5, z = 0.68, p = .495. 




































































p = .708, η2 = .0048. Thus, choice adaptation identified from joint to individual conditions 
was not observed systematically within the two joint production environments. 
Influence of social desirability on joint performance 
 The third objective of this study was to examine whether individual differences in 
social traits modulated joint performances. To do so, we examined correlation coefficients 
between the total score of SDS and the different randomness indices derived from the 
joint-confederate and joint-computer sequences in this study. There was only a marginal 
correlation coefficient to the joint-confederate Digram Use - Only score, which was 
calculated from only response pairs each of which consists of a response of participant 
subsequent to a pre-prepared response of confederate, r (36) = .314, p = .055, but otherwise 
we did not find any significant correlation coefficients, rs (36) < .236, ps > .153. The lack 
of systematic associations replicates the outcomes reported in Towse et al. (2016). 
 
Discussion 
 This study used a joint shared task that is known to tap executive functions and 
aimed at better understanding how task sharing shapes individual cognition by extending 
the findings of the previous study (Towse et al., 2016). In particular, we intended to clarify 
whether individual cognition in task-sharing environments is affected mostly by social 
factors or not. To do so, we investigated whether joint performance differed when 
                                                 




































































participants partnered another human and when they partnered a computer. When 
considered from the perspective of the overall, combined task performance, contrary to our 
initial prediction, results imply that participants behaved in comparable ways regardless of 
agency type, that is whether their partner was a human or computer. That is, both costs and 
benefits from joint performances in comparison with the baseline and individual 
performances were observed in the computer partner condition as well as in the human 
partner condition. This supports a less social view of joint cognition where various 
phenomena unique to joint cognition may be rooted primarily in turn-taking configurations 
rather than social dynamics per se. This in turn suggests that effects identified in Towse et 
al. (2016), in both semi-interactional and fully-interactional configurations, were not simply 
social effects arising from the co-presence of another individual, that is being dependent on 
the presence of another human agency. Nonetheless, this broad conclusion needs to be 
nuanced by important, more specific findings that have also been identified, as well as 
noting some caveats. We found that the frequency of immediate repetition increased when 
alongside a human partner compared to a computer partner. This suggests that the presence 
of a human partner enabled or stimulated participants, at least in part, to regulate their 
responses differently compared to their coupling alongside a computer partner. This also 
tells us that Immediate Repetition can be a sensitive measure that tracks the influence of 
partner’s agency, namely social factors other than cognitive demands of the task itself.  




































































interpersonal similarity affects how participants perform the task, studies are inconsistent 
with respect to whether a human co-actor and a computer co-actor have different 
consequences for behavior (Stenzel et al., 2012). This might be because joint action can 
sometimes be measured just by reaction time. Other performance metrics, that capture 
behavioral choices, might show influences from social dynamics that do not feature in 
chronometry. Joint random generation paradigm provides multiple measures that reflect 
different aspects of executive control; indeed the current study offers clues as to which 
aspects of joint performance are affected by social factors and which are not. Nevertheless, 
those various metrics used here were not mediated by individual differences in social 
desirability. The current data collected from Japanese participants, consistent with the 
conclusions from data collected from Western participants in Towse et al. (2016), provide 
no systematic evidence to suggest that sociability – at least as measured by the specific 
index of the Social Desirability Scale – is an individual difference metric that affects 
cognitive choices in a minimally social situation even among the Japanese who putatively 
belong to a collectivistic culture where they attach importance to group harmony. However, 
it might be valuable for future research to consider the relevance of other social traits such 
as empathy (Davis, 1983), social anxiety (Mattick & Clarke, 1998), and autistic spectrum 
traits (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) in order to 
characterize more fully the social factors that affect joint cognition performance. 




































































leads us to ask; why was Immediate Repetition of random sequences influenced by the 
presence (or absence) of a human partner? We speculate that one of the contributory factors 
is that human presence promoted social learning and imitation. Social learning refers to 
changes in rules for responding to stimuli that are derived from the observation of another 
individual (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013) and can be more strongly triggered while people are 
observing human action compared to non-human robot action (Press, 2011). In the current 
study, participants witnessed the human partner repeating their response more frequently 
than they had normally expected, which encouraged them to understand that they did not 
have to avoid repetitions, so they became more likely to imitate their partner and produce 
repetitions during the joint-confederate condition. While the human partner’s repetitions 
might have seemed intentional, participants might have inferred that the computer’s 
repetitions were accidental. Hence, the computer’s repetitions did not become a cue to 
increase the participant’s repetitions during the joint-computer condition.  
 Towse et al. (2016) concluded that when participants share performance with 
another person on an executive functioning task, and co-produce a response sequence, 
performance is different from that elicited under individual circumstances. At the same time, 
a key conclusion from their analyses is that participants also experience sequence contagion. 
That is, participants treat their partner’s responses as if it were their own, in at least two 
respects. First, they are very reluctant to repeat their partner’s choice, much in the same 




































































also are inclined to make selections that have numerical associations with their partner’s 
choice. That is, they struggled to resist prepotent sequence combinations even where these 
combinations are co-constructed within the dyad. 
 With respect to the first line of evidence, we find that the repetition lag profile in 
the joint-confederate condition – where we assume the participant believed that they were 
collaborating with another person – was very similar to the profile in the joint-computer 
condition – where it was evident to participants that they were in a non-interactional 
environment. Furthermore, both conditions differed from a composite analysis where there 
was no co-production of sequences in real time. This suggests that joint cognition leads to 
modification of response behavior, but human agency is not (always) a necessary condition 
for these changes to take place.  
Otherwise, we must assume participants somehow infer agency to computer 
sequences. We note that computer sequences were generated by the computer using a 
human female voice. This was a deliberate design choice for matching with the 
joint-confederate condition. It seems unlikely, but perhaps this led participants to ascribe 
some human agency to the computer as a result. The natural human voice might be enough 
for participants to feel social dynamics even in absence of physical presence (in the real 
world, this is true for an audio telephone call), even though interacting with a human more 
strongly activates social cognitive network of the brain than interacting with a lap-top 




































































 With respect to the second line of evidence, we examined the extent to which 
response pairs are preferentially selected. Digram Use did not differ between the 
joint-confederate and joint-computer sequences, but joint conditions did differ from 
composite sequences. As above, task-sharing affected response choice, but human agency 
was not particularly critical to the trajectory it took. In contrast, from the perspective of the 
more specific Adjacency values, that is neighboring numeric values only, joint-confederate 
sequences showed fewer associated pairs than joint-computer sequences. However, the 
difference in the Adjacency values was not observed when analyzing only participant 
choices. Again, bearing mind the caveats above, we suggest that human agency may not be 
a necessary condition for the behavioral changes. 
 A separate objective of this study was to investigate choice adaptation – how 
choices are affected by prior experience of what others say and do. This objective focused 
on longer-term influence of task-sharing to examine how prior experience of shared-task 
environments affects individual performance in the subsequent experimental conditions, 
while the initial objective for partner's agency focused on shorter-term influence of 
task-sharing to examine how the presence of a partner affects individual performance 
within one condition. Towse et al. (2016) noted the modest sample size for their analysis of 
choice adaptation and found some tentative, but not statistically significant, evidence that 
participants modify their production behavior based on their shared interactions under joint 




































































production environment, there was a trend for increased repetition performance individually, 
which is more straightforward evidence that choice adaptation can take place. But in 
addition, we also see evidence that such adaptation may be a conscious strategic, volitional 
and thus time-dependent adaptation. This leads us to speculate that such adaptation may be 
rather transient – if there was a gap for example of something like 24 hours between joint 
and individual productions, the adaptation might be at the very least dissipated. This would 
be consistent with evidence from individual random sequence production (Towse & 
Mclachlan, 1999: Experiment 3), albeit from children, where instructions that emphasize 
the relevance and legitimacy of response repetitions can lead to a “bump” in lag-1 
repetitions, whilst other repetition distances are less affected. A strategic choice to “insert” 
more repetitions does not change the full profile of repetition behavior.  
 In conclusion, this study showed that, despite a few exceptional phenomena, joint 
cognition arising from a shared or jointly owned task is less social than we usually expect. 
Many characteristics of individual cognition in joint cognitive tasks might not be shaped by 
effects of social factors such as presence of an interactive partner. Furthermore, we also 
indicated that task-sharing impacts individual cognition over different time scales. At the 
shortest time scale, within an experimental condition, a partner in front of participants has a 
substantial influence in that they commonly make predictable choices (i.e., response 
contagion: more frequent neighboring values and common digram pairings). At a longer 




































































different signals can become more common (i.e., choice adaptation: the increased number 
of immediate repetitions in individual sequences). Finally, we believe that the current study 
emphasizes and reinforces the potential for task-sharing to go beyond the hitherto common 
paradigm of studying cognition amongst individuals only, and restricting questions to those 
in which individuals represent the atomic level of analysis. This does not detract from the 
potential for studies of the individual to yield important insights about cognition, whether 
an individual repeats the same task time and time again, or whether and individual switches 
between different task sets (Allport et al., 1994). Nonetheless, our analysis confirms the 
additional insights and opportunities that follow from a systematic analysis of joint 
cognition and the way in which collaborative, coordinated, or multi-person activities can 
shape cognition. 
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edundancy score based on only the responses of participants is identical to that of the individual-slow
 condition, because 
the com
posite sequences consist of the pre-prepared confederate / com
puter’s sequence and participant’s individual-slow
 sequences. 
 Table 1. M
ean random
ness scores based on all 200 responses in joint sequences [left three colum
ns] and those based on only responses of 
participants in the joint sequences [right three colum
ns] (SD
s in parentheses) 
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 2.24 (2.55) 














































































Randomness scores in joint conditions are the mean scores of those calculated from the first 
and latter 100 responses of joint sequences. 
  
Table 2. Mean randomness scores based on 100 responses of individual sequences and 
those based on 100 responses of joint sequences (SDs in parentheses) 
 Individual-Slow Individual-Fast Joint-Confederate Joint-Computer 
Digram Use 0.264 (0.024) 0.277 (0.036) 0.237 (0.021) 0.236 (0.019) 
Adjacency 13.76 (6.92) 21.24 (7.89) 17.62 (2.49) 19.05 (3.35) 
Immediate 
Repetition 
0.737 (1.445) 0.868 (1.880) 7.36 (2.06) 6.30 (2.15) 




































































Redundancy scores are the same as those in the bottom right of Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3. Means randomness scores based on 100 responses of only participants in joint 
sequences (SDs in parentheses) 
 Participant in Joint-Confederate Participant in Joint-Computer 
Digram Use 0.279 (0.025) 0.269 (0.034) 
Adjacency 21.71 (6.59) 22.87 (6.84) 
Immediate Repetition 0.921 (1.305) 1.000 (1.395) 





































































Fig. 1 The experimental setup of (a) joint-confederate condition and (b) joint-computer 
condition 
Fig. 2 (a) Repetition lags of joint sequences; (b) Self-repetition lags in joint sequences; (c) 
Repetition lags of individual sequences 









































































Table A1. Statistics of t-tests or Wilcoxon's signed rank tests for each performance measure 
in comparisons between individual and joint sequences (for data in Table 2) 
t-test 
Comparison t (37) p η2 
Digram Use 
Individual-Slow vs. Individual-Fast 1.90 .065 .090 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Confederate 5.18 < .001 .423 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Computer 5.64 < .001 .462 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Confederate 5.95 < .001 .490 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Computer 6.48 < .001 .533 
Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 0.08 .940 < .001 
Adjacency 
Individual-Slow vs. Individual-Fast 9.63 < .001 .723 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Confederate 3.92 < .001 .292 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Computer 5.16 < .001 .423 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Confederate 3.30 .002 .230 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Computer 1.86 .070 .084 
Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 3.20 .003 .221 
Immediate Repetition 
Individual-Slow vs. Individual-Fast 0.66 .515 .012 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Confederate 18.72 < .001 .903 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Computer 15.64 < .001 .865 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Confederate 15.14 < .001 .865 




































































Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 2.36 .024 .130 
Redundancy 
Individual-Slow vs. Individual-Fast 2.09 .044 .109 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Confederate 3.34 .002 .230 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Computer 3.14 .003 .212 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Confederate 0.09 .931 < .001 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Computer 0.17 .867 < .001 
Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 0.45 .656 .005 
Wilcoxon's signed rank test 
Comparison T z p 
Immediate Repetition 
Individual-Slow vs. Individual-Fast 46.00 0.82 .414 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Confederate 0.00 5.38 < .001 
Individual-Slow vs. Joint-Computer 0.00 5.38 < .001 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Confederate 0.00 5.38 < .001 
Individual-Fast vs. Joint-Computer 0.00 5.31 < .001 






































































Table A2. Statistics of t-tests for the frequency of repetition lag at each lag value in 
comparisons between confederate, computer, and composite sequences in Fig. 2a 
Comparison t (37) p η2 
Lag 3 
Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 0.22 .831 .002 
Joint-Confederate vs. Composite 3.83 < .001 .281 
Joint-Computer vs. Composite 4.10 < .001 .314 
Lag 4 
Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 0.53 5.99 .008 
Joint-Confederate vs. Composite 3.61 .001 .260 
Joint-Computer vs. Composite 4.15 < .001 .314 
Lag 5 
Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 0.52 .606 .008 
Joint-Confederate vs. Composite 1.91 .064 .090 
Joint-Computer vs. Composite 2.96 .005 .194 
Lag 6 
Joint-Confederate vs. Joint-Computer 0.86 .398 .020 
Joint-Confederate vs. Composite 9.43 < .001 .706 

























































































Fig.2 Click here to download Figure Fig.2.tif 
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